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)

Civil No. 15669

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents, who were the plaintiffs below, brought
this action in the district court for Summit County after the
appellants, defendants below, barred access to respondents'
property in wnite Pine Canyon.

Appellants had

erec~ed

two
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iron gates across the existing roadway in the canyon where the
roadway crosses appellants' property which lies just above
and below respondents' property in the canyon.

The district

court, Judge George E. Balli£, sitting without a jury, held
that the roadway in the canyon is and has been, since before
the turn of the century, a public road and enjoined appellants
from further interference with the use of the roadway by
respondents and the public.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The appellants are the successors in interest, as the
grantees, of their father John Candas who, in an earlier lawsuit
in 1928, was successful in establishing that the roadway in White
Pine Canyon is a public road.

The questions presented by the

appeal are the following:
l.

Whether it was error to receive in evidence the

testimony of deceased witnesses who testified for John Candas
in the earlier case as to the public character of the roadway,
where the transcript of the testimony in the earlier case has
been lost and the only record of the testimony of the deceased
witnesses is found in the Abstract on Appeal and in the brief of
John Candas which were filed in this court in the earlier case?
2.

Whether the pleadings of John Candas in the earlier

case, in which he alleged the public character of the roadway,
were admissible in this case?
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3.

Whether appellants are judicially estopped, by

the position of John Condas in the earlier case, from arguing
that the roadway is a private road?
4.

Whether appellants are collaterally estopped, by

the findings in the earlier case, from litigating in this case
the public or private character of the roadway?
5.

Whether the evidence establishes that appellants'

property, while part of the public domain, was subject to a
public road which has not been vacated?
STATUTES INVOLVED
The follo1.;ing statutes are invol·Jed i:1 this

~

.,J_eeding:

Revised statutes of the United States, § 2477 (43 U.C.A.
§ 932):

"The right of way for the consc:uction of
high1.;ays over public lands, r.o: reserved for public
uses, is hereby granted."
l.!tah Code Annotated, § 27-12-89:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuouslv used as a public thoroughfare for a period
of 10 years·."
Utah Code Annotated, § 27-12-90:
"All public highways once established shall continue
to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the
highwav authorities having jurisdiction over any
such hi;:;hi.Jay, or by other competent authority."
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Background Of This Lawsuit.

White Pine Canyon is situated about three
west of Park City.

m~les

north-

The mouth of the canyon is at the end of a

paved road known as Trottman Lane which turns off to the west
from the highway to Park City south of Kimball's Junction.

At the

end of the lane is a dirt roadway which continues south across
the properties of both parties to the top of the canyon.
In 1924 John Candas, the appellants' father and his
brother Pete Candas, the respondents' father, travelled to White
Pine Canyon to talk to one Delbert Redden about his property
which was situated near the mouth of the canyon.

John Candas

purchased the Redden property and then he and Pete and another
brother homesteaded other lands farther up the canyon. (R. 500.)
In 1927, John Candas was sued by his immediate neighbor,
Patrick Sullivan, who owned the property just below John Candas at
the mouth of the canyon.

Sullivan charged John Candas with trespass

as he drove his sheep along the roadway where it crossed the
Sullivan property. The outcome of the lawsuit, about whict more
will be said later, was in favor of John Candas.

Sullivan

v. Candas, 76 U. 585, 290 Pac. 954 (1928).
The property homesteaded by Pete Candas lies just above
the former Redden property and just below another parcel of land
which John Candas later acquired.

One cannot reach the respondents'

-4-
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property from the bottom or from the top of the canyon without
crossing the property acquired by John Condas and later conveyed to
appellants.

(R. 402-404, 504-525, 575-579; Pl. Ex. 1.)

For many years and while John Condas was alive, Pete
Condas and his family used the roadway in the canyon for access
to their property.

Then, in 1970, after John Condas had died and

after Pete Condas turned down the appellants' proposal that Pete
give them power to sell his property in conjunction with their
property, appellants erected the two iron gates across the roadway
with the result that respondents could not reach their property.
(R. 517-521.)
Appellants also asked the Summit County Cornoission to
vacate a part of the "public road" which crossed their land,
the former Redden property.

(R. 977-983.)

Acting on appellants'

representation that no one else used the roadway (R. 983.), the
Commission, without prior public notice, adopted an

~rdinance

proporting to vacate part of the "public road" where it crosses
the former Redden property, as appellants had requested.

After

learning of respondents' interest in the roadway and following
consultation •..;ith the Countv Attorney, the Commission concluded
that its action in vacating the road was in error and a
nullity.

(R. 1002-1007, 1009-1010.)
B.

Resoondents' Position At The Trial.

Respondents took the position that (l) the roadway became
a public road by federal grant and public user long before John
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and Pete Condas came to White Pine Canyon, (2) the Summit County
ordinance purporting to vacate a part of the public road was a
nullity for lack of notice and (3) if the roadway was not a public
road, nevertheless they had a prescriptive right to use the roadway.
On

the creation of the public road in the early days

respondents offered in evidence the pleadings of John Condas,
the testimony of his witnesses and the findings of fact in the
earlier Sullivan lawsuit. (R. 405, 422-435.)

Respondents

also offered in evidence the testimony of several men who were
still alive who were able to testify as to early public use of
the roadway before and after John Condas acquired the Redden
property in 1924.

The testimony of these men covered the years

from 1903 to 1931.

They testified that the public used the canyon

for hunting, logging and trailing livestock and that public
travel in the canyon was on foot and by horseback, by teams of
horses pulling bobsleighs loaded with logs and by trucks and cars.

(R. 478-497.)
Appellants have not discussed in their brief respondents'
evidence which was obtained from the Sullivan case.

That evidence

is summarized as follows:
l.

The pleadings of John Condas. In his answer and

counterclaim John Condas plead that the roadway in White Pine
Canyon was "* '" * a public highway and has been used ,., "· -'· by the
public generally

* **

for more than sixty years past. -'· " -'·"

graph 5 of John Condas counterclaim reads in full, as follows
(Ex.2-P, pp. 17):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.

The testimony of John Condas' witnesses.

Five

persons who are no longer living testifiec for John Condas in the
Sullivan case as to the public's use of the roadway.

One of the

witnesses was Mr. Redden from whom John Condas purchased the
property appellants now occupy.

Pertinent portions of that

testimony, as set forth in the abstract prepared by Patrick
Sullivan's lawyer in his appeal to this Court (Ex. 2-P),
are set forth in the Appendix A to this brief.

In every respect

the accuracy of the abstracted testimony is verified by the
verbatim quotat~ons of that testimony which are contained in
John Condas' brief which was filed in this Court. (Ex. 3-P, p. 8.)
3.

Findings of fact.

The findings of fact in the

Sullivan case, as to the nature and extent of the public's use
of the roadwav are in Finding ~o. 8, which reads as follows
(Ex . Sponsored
.2-P, by)'.-'+0.
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8.
The Court finds that more than fifty years
ago the inhabitants of Park City, Snyderville and
surrounding territory, and the public generally
constructed and used a roadway up White Pine Canyon,
through over and across Lot 8, Township 2 South
Range 3 East, which lands now belong to the
plaintiffs, [Sullivan property] and said roadway,
as so constucted, was and has been, for more than
fifty years last past, used by the public generally
as a public highway, for the general purposes of
traffic, including the hauling and transportation
of logs, fire wood, lumber, mining timber, supplies
for mining operations, and for the trailing of
livestock, including cattle, sheep and horses, and
for all purposes for which public highways, under
similar conditions, are generally used.
C.

Appellants' Position At The Trial.

Appellants confined their case to the testimony of
themselves and others as to the physical condition of the roadway
after the turn of the century and the efforts of John Condas to
restrict traffic on the roadway by means of wooden gates which,
from time to time, he placed across the roadway where it crosses
the former Redden property.
Appellants never attempted at any time to offer in
evidence anything from the record of the Sullivan case.

They

never attempted to show that the position taken by John Condas,
his witnesses and the district court in the Sullivan case was in
error so far as the public ch<'racter of the roadway is concerned.
In short, as to the public character of the roadway prior to 1924,
appellants offered nothing at all.

It was as though, from appellanCo

point of view, the early history of the canyon had no significance
D.

The Trial Court's Decision In This Case.

The trial court's findings of fact and its conclusions of
of law are found at page 211 in the record on appeal anc.i are se(
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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forth in the Appendix B to this brief.

In summary, the trial

court found as follows:

(1)

The roadway in White Pine Canyon had been used

by the public for more than 50 years prior to 1928.

(Fdgs.

3-4.)

(2)

John Candas took the position in the Sullivan

case, that the roadway across his property was a public road.
(Fdg. 6.)

(3)

The district court in Sullivan found the

public's use of the roadway since 1873 to have been "openly,
notoriously, continuously, uninterruptedly, adversly and
under claim of right as a public road", and appell'lrts
this case offered no evidence to the contrary.

(4)

in

(Fdg. 7 .8.)

John Condas, by gates and signs, sought to

prevent the public's use of the roadway after 1925 (Fdgs.

9-12) but the public continued to ..:s"' c:·.e roadway until 1971
(Fdg.

5).

(5)

Respondents did not establish a prescriptive

right of passage over the roadway.

(6)

(Fdg. 14.)

Respondents are denied access to their property

and the public is denied use of the roadway by reason of iron
gates put up by appellants in 1971.
( 7)

(Fdg. 15 .)

Hhen appellants asked the County Commission to

vacate a portion of the road1vay on their land as a public
road t:-:e\· represented to the Commission that no one but
themselves

use~

the roadway.

(Fdg. 17 )
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(8)

Notice of the vacation was not given to

respondents or to the public. (Fdg. 18.)
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the
roadway as it passes through and beyonu appellants' property in
the canyon is a public road and that the Summit County ordinance
proporting to vacate part of the road was null and void.

(R. 215.)

The trial court decreed that the roadway is a public
road and enjoined appellants from interferring with the use of the
(R. 216-217.)

road by respondents and the public.

The decree

is reproduced as Appendix C to this brief.
ARGUMENT
I

THE FORMER TESTIMONY OF
WITNESSES IN THE SULLIVAN
CASE IS ADMISSIBLE IN THIS CASE
The trial court received in evidence the former testimony of persons who were witnesses for John Condas in Sullivan v.
Condas and had testified in that case on the public's use of the
roadway in White Pine Canyon.
The rule of evidence involved is Rule 63(3), Utah Rules
of Evidence, which admits former testimony as an exception to the
hearsay rule, on certain conditions.

The rule reads in pertinent

part as follows:
(3) Depositions and Prior Testimony. Subject
to the same limitations and objections as though the
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declarant were testifyinf in person* * *:
(b) if
the judge finds that the declarant is unavailable
as a witness at the hearing, testimony given as a
witness in another action 1, * *, when (i) the testimony is offered against a party who offered it in
his own behalf on the former occasion, or against
the successor i~ interest of such party, * * *·
In this case the former testimony was offered on counsel's
representation to the court that the former witnesses were no longer
living.

(R. 417.)

Appellants did not object to the representation

that the former witnesses were unavailable.

The former testimony

was offered against the appellants as the successors in interest
as grantees, of the party, John Candas, who offered the testimony
in his own behalf on the former occasion.

The requirements of

the rule were complied with in every detail.
The rule does not require "reprocity" or "mutuality"
in the sense that the party who offers the former testimony
must also have been a party in the prior proceeding.

It is only

necessary that the testimony be offered against a party who offered
it before or his successors in interest.

Placing substance over

form, the Utah rule recognizes "that it is only the party against
whom the former testimony is nm• offered, whose presence as a
party in the previous suit is significant."
2d ed.,

§

McCormick On Evidence,

256 at p. 618.
Although subpart (b) (i) of the rule does not require the

identity of issues for which appellants argue (Br. 19), certainly
the issue in both cases are not only substantially but precisely
the same, namelv the existence of a public road in White Pine Canyon.
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Because the reporter's transcript of the testimony in
the Sullivan case has been lost (R. 419), only the abstract of
the record on appeal (Ex. 2-P) and the brief of John Condas
(Ex. 3-P) which are on file in this Court were available to
respondents to prove the former testimony.

Both the abstract

and the brief contain references to the pages of the lost
transcript from which they were prepared.
The circumstances under which the abstract and the brief
were prepared argue forcefully for their accuracy in reporting
the former testimony.

Both documents were prepared in an appeal

in this Court where any misstatements by either lawyer would have
been challenged.

The documents were prepared with the lost trans-

cript in hand and they were prepared by the persons who asked
the former questions and heard the former answers given.

Finally,

when the verbatim quotations of the testimony in the brief of
John Condas are compared with the abstract prepared by Patrick
Sullivan's lawyer, it can be seen that the two documents agree
in every material respect.
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the former
testimony was properly received in evidence.
II
THE STATEMENT OF JOHN CONDAS, IN
HIS PLEADINGS IN THE SULLIVAN CASE,
THAT THE ROADWAY ACROSS HIS PROPERTY
IS A PUBLIC ROAD IS ADMISSIBLE AS A
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST AND AS
A JUDICIAL ADMISSION
The trial court received in evidence the statement in
the answer and counterclaim of John Condas in the Sullivan case
(Ex. 2-P), that the roadway across his property is a public road.
The statement when made was clearly a declaration against
the proprietary interest of John Condas for it acknowledged that
his property was burdened with a public road.

The statement also

has the standing of a judicial admission.
Rule 63(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides for
the admission of declarations against interest as follows
(10)
Declarations A ainst Interest. Subject to
the limitations o except~on
, a statement which the
judge finds was made by a declarant who is unavailable
as a witness and which was at the time of the assertion
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest * * * that t~e declarant under the
circumstances would not have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true;
Appellants appear to concede that the declaration of
a third person may be used against a party whenever privity of
estate exists, as this Court stated in Lvman Grazing Association
v. Smith, 24 l 2d 443,473 P. 2d 905 (1970), and that such a statement by John Condas himself 1vould be admissible in this case because
oi the privity of estate that exists between him and the appellants,

his grantees.

(Br. 15-16.)

Appellants apparently object to the admission of the statement, as a declaration against interest, only because the statement
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was made in pleadings prepared not by John Condas but by
his lawyer.

The objection is not well founded.

"[P]leadings

shown to have been prepared or filed by counsel employed by
a party, are primafacie regarded as authorized by him and
entitled to be received as his admission."

McCormick, Hand

Book of the Law of Evidence, 1954, § 242, at p. 513.

Wigmore

notes that a party in litigation "speaks always through his
pleadings", as well as through the testimony of his witnesses,
and states that "the basis upon which may be predicated a
discrediting inconsistency on his part includes the whole
range of facts asserted in his pleadings and in the testimony
relied upon by him."
at p. 1217.

Wigmore On Evidence, 1904 ed.,

§

1048,

"That the statements of the pleading are not

those of the party himself must be immaterial since they are those
of his authorized attorney.

* ;, *

That the pleadings in prior

causes, then, can be treated as the parties' admissions, usable
as evidence in later causes, must be conceded . .,, * *"
supra,

§

Wigmore,

1066, at pp. 1245, 1246.
Appellants have not challenged the accuracy of the

statements in the pleadings concerning the public road, nor
do they even suggest that the statement in question was anything
less than an authorized statement of John Condas' position as
to the existence of a public road across his property.

-14-
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Appellants take issue (Br. 14-15) with the trial court's
language in referring to the statements in John Condas' pleadings
as "admissions against interest" (R. 190).

It is clear from

the trial court's decision what the court meant to say.
court should not be made "an offender for a word."

The trial

The appellants

discussion (Br. 13-15) of vicarious admissions is beside the
point.

What is important here is that John Candas made a

statement, through his lawyer in the Sullivan case, which
was a declaration against his interest at the time it was made.
Such a statement may properly be used against his grantees, the
appellants, in this case.
The statement of John Candas in his pleadings that the
roadway over his property is a public road is also admissible
as a judicial admission under Rule 63(7) Utah Rules of Evidence,
which provides as follows:
(7) Admissions by parties. As against himself a
statement by a person who is a party to the action in
his individual * * * capacity * * *.
"Judicial admissions are not evidence at all, but are
formal admissions in the pleadings in the case

* * *

by a party

or his counsel lvhich have the effect of withdrawing a fact from
issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact.
McCormick On Evidence, 2d ed., 1972,

262, at p. 630.

Such ad-

missions are in the same category as a response to a request to
admit under the rules of civil procedure.

Ibid, footnote 11.

The same authority notes, at page 636 of the cited text, "the
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sensible view that pleadings shown to have been prepared or filed
by counsel employed by the party, are prima facie regarded as
authorized by him and are entitled to be received as his
admissions. *

*

*"

To the same effect are "the statements of a grantor
of realty, made while title was

·k

*

i<

still in h"~m ; such stateII

ments "are receiveable as admissions against any grantee claiming
under him.

***

It is sufficient to note that the principle is

today fully and universally conceded. * * *"
1972, vol. IV,

§

1082, at p. 210.

An admission of course, is

sufficient to support a finding of fact.
73 U. 59, 272 Pac. 229 (1928)
"the admissibility of admissions

Wigmore on Evidence,

Peterson v. Richards,

The note to Rule 63(7) contemplates

* * *

by those by whose state-

ments" a party "is bound."
III

APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED
FROM CHALLENGING THE
PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE
ROADWAY IN WHITE PINE CANYON
There are several grounds for estopple against the
appellants in this case.
A.

Each will be presented separately.

Appellants are judicially estopped by the position

taken by John Candas in the Sullivan case:--In his counterclaim
in the Sullivan case John Candas took the position that a "public
highway" runs "through and beyond the said lands of the defendant"·
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his own property, and "has been used continuously by the
public generally

* ,., *

for more than sixty years".

***

(Ex. 2-P,

at p. 17.)
If John Condas were alive today and the defendant in
this lawsuit, he would be prevented by the doctrine of judicial
estopple from taking a position different from the one he took
in the Sullivan case.

John Condas received a benefit in the first

trial and would be estopped from changing his position to receive
another benefit now--from playing "fast-and-loose with the
court".

Mecham v. City of Glendale, 489 P. 2d 65, 67 (Ariz.

1971).
It was the rule of many courts for quite some time
that a judicial estopple could not operate where the partners
were not the same in both cases.

This position was based upon

the view that mutuality of parties was essential to the operation
of any estopple.

See this Court's opinion in Tracy Loan and TrustCo.

v. Openshaw In·.. Company, 102 U. 509, 132 P. 2d 388 (1942).
The requirement of mutality has since fallen in disfavor.
For example, in the application of the related doctrine of
"collateral estopple", this Court has said that it is not
necessary that the parties be the same in both cases.
v. Hodson,

26 C.

2d 113, :.85 P . .2d 1044, 10:.6 (1971).

Richards
And in

California, the requirement of mutuality of estoppel, as a limit
to the scope of collateral estoppel, has been rejected.
Furs.

lr:c

"·

Llor:1inion :Lr:surance Comoanv,

Teitelbaum

375 P. 2d 439 (Cal.
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1962); cert den. 372 U.S. 966.

In Mecham v. City of Glendale,

supra, the Supreme Court of Arizona applied the doctrine of
judicial estopple where mutuality of parties did not exist.
Although appellants mention Mecham v. City of Glendale,
supra, in their brief (p. 24), they do not appear to take
issue with the Arizona court's holding that judicial estoppel
does not require a mutuality of parties.

Appellants offer no

reason why they should not be held to the posisition taken
by their grantor as to the public road across his property.
B.

Appellants are collaterally estooped from reliti-

gating the issue of a public road in White Pine Canvon:--A branch
of the doctrine of res judicata is the principle of collateral
estoppel which prevents the relitigating of material facts or
issues which are essential to and were established or determined
in a former action, Richards v. Hodson, 26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044.
1046 (1971); Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 U.2d 51, 305 P.2d
503, 506 (1957).

It is not necessary that all parties be the

same in the two actions.

Richards, supra, at p. 1046.

The facts found and issues determined in the Sullivan
case which are pertinent here are those which have to do with
the public use of the road over the defendants' lands.

The

findings of fact of the trial court in the Sullivan case which
are pertinent here are No. 8 and 9 (Ex. 2-P, at pp. 41-43) which
in summary, states that the use made of the road by the public
was ''openly, notoriously, continuously, uninterruptedly, adversel~

-18-
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and under claim of right for more than fifty years" (Fdg. No.
"up White Pine Canyon" for "the general purposes of traffic

9)

* * *

for all purposes for which public highways, under similar
conditions are generally used" (Fdg. No. 8).
It begs the point to say that the findings in the
Sullivan case refer primarily to the Sullivan property. Of course
they do, since this is where the trespass was charged and the
public's use of the Candas property had been admitted.

But to

avoid the charge of trespass, John Candas had to prove the public
character of the road over the Sullivan property and to do that
he had to prove that the public used the road over the Sullivan
property and on up the canyon "through and beyond" his ow'TI lands
as well.

(See paragraph 14 of his answer (Ex. 2-P at pp. 17-18)).

If John Candas had been the only person to use the road the use
uould have been "private" rather than "public".

Without the public's

use further up the canyon, there would have been no occasion for
the public to use the road over the Sullivan property.

The

findings of fact as to the publ~c's use of the road were material
to the outcome of that lawsuit and,

therefore, establish the

public character of chat use in this lawsuit.
7hat the findings of fact were

~or

rather than against

John Candas is a distinction without a difference--it does not
relieve his successors from the effect of cne finding.

The faces

were material facts in a lawsuit ~n which their successor was
a part:-'.
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IV
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES
THE EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC
ROAD ON APPELLANTS'
PROPERTY WHILE IT WAS
PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The evidence in this case on the public's use of the
roadway in White Pine Canyon in the early days is of necessity
one sided since appellants chose to confine their evidence
to the physical condition of the roadway and its use after
the turn of the century.

Respondents' evidence consists of

the testimony of persons who used the roadway before and after
the turn of the century.
The persons who testified as to the earliest public use
of the roadway were the witnesses of John Candas in the Sullivan
case.

Portions of the abstacted former testimony of these persons

are reproduced in the Appendix A to this brief.

The testimony

in the Sullivan case was reviewed by this Court, on Mr. Sullivan's
appeal, in the following language (76 U. 290 Pac. at 957):

* * *

There is ample and satisfactory evidence
to show that as early as 1873 the roadway extended
up and down the canyon over the lands now owned
by the plaintiffs [Sullivan] and the defendant
[John Candas] and others, while such lands were
a part of the public domain, and was traveled and
used by the public generally as occasion required
in going up and down the canyon. ,., ,., ,.,
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Before leaving this discussion of the former testimony
from the Sullivan case, it should be stated that at no time
during the trial did appellants proffer any evidence from the
Sullivan case.

The trial of this case commenced on March 21, 1977,

and concluded ten days later on March 21, 1977.

Thereafter counsel

for both parties appeared before the trial court in oral
argument on April 13, 1977 and again on October 28, 1977, after
the trial court's decision, in argument on the findings of fact,
conclusions o: law and decree.

Counsel for appellants never

asked the trial court at any time to consider anything from the
Sullivan case which was not already before it.
Respondents offered additional evidence on the public
road from other persons, still living, who were in the canyon in
their early years.

James Archibald. in his deposition, told of

his travel in the canyon in 1898 with his father and a logging
crew who brought logs out of the canyon with teams of horses as
often as three times a day every day when it .,.;asn't storming.
Xr. Archibald also told of his travel in the canyon in l90J and
from 1905 to 1907.

(S..

479. deposition. ?P· 5-6. 8, 10.)

Douglas

Archibald. Earl Johnson, Gilbert ~imbal: and Soencer Young
testified of tneir travel in :he canvon in the vears between
l905 to 19.:'4.

(?.

-..75. Earl Johnson depositiLn, ;:>p.

J. 7-8.

437, 443-447. -..54, -..57. 459, -..ol. -..oJ. -..o/. -..70.)
~estiDony o~

1

the ?ublic s use of the

road~dv ~~hile

John ConJ.1s ~;3s ali~·e ~as ~i\'etl b·.· F~~J ~rc\m~nc ~;~ 0 \;or~~~
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for John Candas off and on from 1925 to 1930 and lived on the
property for six months in 1926.

Mr. Browning testified in his

deposition that he observed people going up and down the road on
horses and in wagons, pickup trucks and cars.

He also testified

that John Candas had said to him that people could not be stopped
from using the road because it had been a public road for too
many years.

(R. 483, 486, 489-495.)

In the opinion of the trial court, respondents "produced
additional credible evidence during the trial to corroborate the
evidence contained in the transcripts of Sullivan, and further
substantiate the findings of the trial judge in Sullivan."
(R. 189,191.)

Appellants, on the other hand, offered no evidence on
the existence or nonexistence of the roadway while their property
was a part of the public domain.

No attempt was made by them to

disprove the former testimony or this Court's conclusion, based
on that and additional testimony, of the existence of the public
road before John Candas came to White Pine Canyon.

It would not

be an overstatement to say, paraphrazing this Court's opinion
in the Sullivan case, that there is ample, satisfactory and
unchallenged evidence that a public road existed over the
appellants' property while it was part of the public domain.

v
APPELLANT'S PROPERTY IS SUBJECT
TO THE PUBLIC ROAD IN WHITE PINE
CANYON
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Pursuant to federal law the public is granted a right
of way over the public domain.
§

The grant is contained in

2477 of the Revised Statutes of the United States and is quoted,

supra, at page 3.

This Court had occasion to review the

federal grant and the related state statute, V.C.A.
supra. at p.

§

27-12-89,

3, in its opinion in the Sullivan case where it

was held that when federal land patents are issued for lands
on which public roads have been established,

the patents are

issued subject to such roads and the persons who accept the
patents take the lands subject to the public's rights in
those lands.

(1928).

Sullivan v. Condas,

76 U. 585, 290 Pac. at 957

In the language of the Sullivan opinion,

* * *

The patent to the land issued to the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs [Sullivan]
in 1906 about the thirty-three years * * * [after
the roadway came into existence].
Plaintiffs
acquired their interest in the lands in 1922 or
1924. The right of way ~aving been established
over public lands by public user, the predecessors
of the plaintiffs when t~e patent was issued to
them, and the plaintiffs when they acquired their
interest in and to the lands, took them subject
to the easement in favor of the public. unless
it was thereafter extenguished bv operation of
the state law, which was not done. * * *
The trial court in this case determined that the
action of the SLL'ilillit Count:: co=issioner~ in 3.ttec.Jptin~ to
vacate the public road was null and void f2r lack of notice.
Appellants do not challenge that determination.
said in Sullivan that a public road

\:co

Pac.

at

This Court

os;1
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"when once established must continue to be a
highway until abandoned ~y order of th~ boa:d
of county commissioners ~n the county ~n wh~ch
it is located or by a judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction."
Section 27-12-90 of the Utah Code, which is now in
effect, quoted, supra, page 3, is clear.
All public highways once established shall
continue to be highways until abandoned or
vacated * 1< * by * * * competent authority
Appellants have offered no legal reason why the trial
court should not have applied the law of the Sullivan case and
U.C.A.

§

27-12-90 to this case,

When the law of Sullivan and

the statute are applied to this case, the result is that the
White Pine Canyon Road was a public road before appellants came
to the canyon and has remained a public road since that time.
VI
APPELLANTS' HISTORY OF THE
ROADWAY IN WHITE PINE CANYON
AFTER THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
IS IRRELEVANT AJ.'W INCOMPLETE
Respondents are reluctant to go into a lengthy discussion of the evidence, theirs and appellants', as to the
public's use of the roadway after it had become established
as a public road for the reason that to do so might be taken
as a concession that such evidence is relevant.
cession is intended.

No such con-

But re span d en t s d o Wls
· h to re f er briefly

-24-
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to a number of inconsistencies and omissions in the rather
lengthy but one-sided discussion of the history of the canyon
after the turn of the century.
A.

The former testimony of deceased witnesses has

been ignored:--The discussion of respondents' evidence (Br. 28-30)
omits any mention of the five witnesses who testified to the
earliest public use of the road in the Sullivan trial.

One of

those witnesses was appellants' predecessor in interest, Delbert
Redden, who testified, "To my personal knowledge, a wagon road
extended above the Candas house up White Pine Canyon clear to
the top.
2-P, pp.

It was always there*** while I lived there."
100-101 quoted in Appendix A.)

(Ex.

To say that "plaintiff's

own evidence" is contrarv to the findings of fact (Br.

30) is a

total misstatement.
B.
refer to maps,

The documents have been misused·--Appellants
survey notes and homestead papers (Br.

as establishing a "very clear inference" (Er.
rather than a road existed in the canyon.

30-32)

31) that a "trail"

One has to bear in

mind that when appellants speak of a road or a trail they do
not have "use" in mind.

They. are talking about '\.;idth" and

to them anything less than eight or ten feet in
trail (R.

309-910, 3So.)

Eie;l~t or

wi~th

is a

ten :ee::. of .:curse.

is arr.ple

width for the ~orses and later the wagons . .::ars and trucks
which were to travel in the canvon.
infra.

C~ris Cond~s.

(F~;.

5.

one of :~e a~pe~~a~:s.

A~p~~dix

C.

testified that
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the old wagons were only five feet wide. (R. 810.)

The earliest

government map, prepared in 1901, shows

(Ex. 31-D.)

'1

"trail".

Someone must have been using the canyon before that time.
No evidence was offered to show what was intended by
the statements on the homestead documents.

(Br. 31-32.)

Certainlv

they were not intended to mean that no road existed in the
canyon since not only Pete Condas but also John Condas and
Delbert Redden made such statements (Br. 32; Exs. 33-D, 34-D,
and 35-D) and both John Condas, by his pleadings, and Delbert
Redden, by his testimony, took the position in the Sullivan case
that a public road existed over their property.

Moreover

the homestead papers for Pete Condas and also his brother Gust
were prepared by John Condas.
C.

(R. 553-554.)

The issue is not whether a public road was estab-

lished across private property by public user:--Appellants discussion of the physical condition of the road and its use in
later years (Br. 32-40) is intended to support the argument that
the public did not acquire an interest in appellants' property
by public user (Br. 40).

This is a "smokescreen" to attempt

to obscure the real point in issue which is public user before
the property was acquired from the public domain.

Appellants

have ignored the fifty years of public use before John Condas
purchased the Redden place.
There is a conflict in the testimony as to physical
condition of the road at various times from the 1920's on.
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Physical condition varies with intensity of use.
establish the absence of prior public rights.

It does not

Without going into

great detail, we would mention one part of the evidence on the
physical condition of the road which appellants have ignored.
Mr.

David Street was the driver who took a caterpillar tractor

up the road before appellants claim they made a "passable road"
(Br.

33-34, R.

692.)

Mr.

Street therefore,

saw the condition

of the road before appellants claimed to have made it.

Judge

Ballif saw the road afterwards at the commencement of the
trial.

A film was taken of the road about the time Judge Ballif

saw the road and that film was shown during the trial so that
both Judge Ballif and Mr.

Street could see it.

Mr. Street

then testified that the road he saw in the film was substantially
the same road he had travelled,
along the road and that

~e

that he recalled very point

did not have to use his blade when

he drove a caterpillar up the road.

(R. 1065, 1068-1069.)

Street further explained that he knew,

from his experience,

Mr.
that

the road he travelled had not been made by a cater?illar
because of "these little jigs" in the road.

"There 1•ouLi

be more straight stretches. ***Because t~ere wouldn't
be no object in dodging around the little p0ints like this
to get any·..:here."
D.

(R.

~065.)

Gates and si2ns do not Jestrov a

~ublic

road --

To be sur~. af:er winning his lawsuit with Patrick Sullivan.
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John Condas put up fences and signs to obstruct public use.
Appellants argument that such action "is incompatible with the
requisite intentions of John G. Condas or his successors (themselves] to abandon the roadway to the public use" is again beside
the point.

(Br. 41.)

Patrick Sullivan had also put up gates

and he too made a point of it in his appeal.

This Court

responded to Mr. Sullivan as follows (290 Pac. at 957):
A further point is made that gates were put
up by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest, thereby indicating that the character
of the roadway was a private roadway and interrupted
the use of it. But there is ample evidence to
show that whatever gates or fences were put up
were erected after the roadway had for many years
been established and used as a public highway by
the public generally and by those who had occasion
to use it and was so continued to be used after
as before whatever gates or fences were erected.
The teaching of Sullivan is that private parties cannot destroy public rights in an already established public
road by gates and signs.

No contrary authority has been cited

by appellants.
There is no "irreconcilable" conflict in the trial
courts' findings, as appellants argue.

(Br. 42.)

The existence

of gates and private interference with public travel after 1924
do not a private road make out of a public road that came into
existence in 1873.

Appellants cite no authority for the pro-

position that private interference with public travel can
achieve such a result.

Actually, as the evidence showed, the
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wooden gates were not an obstruction to public travel.

The

trial court found that "the public continued to use the roadway
until it was closed by the defendants in 1971" (Fdg. 4) when
"defendants placed iron gates across the roadway" as a result
of which the public including appellants was ''denied free travel
along said road" (Fdg. 15).
The point of all of this is that no amount of wrongful
conduct--in total disregard of the rights of others and of the
law--can destroy the public road.

Whatever John Condas and the

appellants have done over the years to obstruct public travel
over the road was no more lawful than the actions of Patrick
Sullivan years before.

Appellants cannot prevail on such

conduct.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Claron C. Spencer
Attorney for appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing brief was
mailed to the counsel for appellants this 7th dav of
September, 1978.

C aron C

Spencer
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APPENDIX A

Selected portions of the abstract of the testimony of
persons who testified on behalf of John Condas in Sullivan v.
Condas relating to the public's use of the roadway in White Pine
Canyon are set out below.

The page references are to the Abstract

in Sullivan v. Condas which is plaintiffs' Exhibit 2-P in this
case.
MR.

WILLim~

ARCHIBALD:

Page 70:

* * *

I have known White Pine and Red Pine

Canyons since about 1870.

I know the Sullivan

ranch and the Condas =anch.

They are both sit-

uated in the mouth of White Pine Canyon.
van's ranch is

do~n

Sulli-

north of Condas' ranch.

north belongs to me.

Land

I join thE Sullivan ranch

on the north with 99.3 acres.

* * *
There is a roadway leading from the Park Citv
highway up to plaintiffs',
and Condas' ranches.

t~at

is up to Sullivan's

It starts dov.n ·...rhat •..:e call

the Trottman residence and parallels the section
line until i: gets 1,;i:::hin about ..'0 rods of the tol,nship corner,

~here

it turns souchwest into Sullivan's

place anci crosses the corner of mv land.

It chen
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runs along pretty close to the foot of the bench, up
past what is now the Sullivan house and runs on up
there to the Condas ranch.

It goes right up White

Pine Canyon into the basin.
Pages 71-72 :

Q.

How long have you known, to your own knowl-

edge has there been a roadway leading up along in a
general way the present course of the road which we
saw yesterday?
(Objection)
Since 1873.

For hauling lumber, for driving

livestock up in the hills, and for hauling wood and
general building material for the settlement in
shape of timber.

This road has been used generally

by the public for those purposes during that entire
period.

The road has run in the direction of the

present road.

***

While I hve known this road

it has been well defined and a well traveled road.
Thereis no means of ingress and egress to White
Pine canyon other than along the course of this
road.

***

Pages 74-75:
On cross examination the witness Archibald testified as follows·

***

There is no possibility of automobile travel

beyond the Candas place.

There was a good road

above the Candas place when we were logging.
1903.

In

The road there was used for logging clear
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the Salt Lake County line.
1903-1906.

The logging ceased in

The logs were cut up by the sawmill

right on this flat, just in front of that little
hollow that runs up this side of Mr. Sullivan's
house, and on the Sullivan tract.

At that time

the purpose of the road was for hauling wood and
lumber, and driving cattle up into White Pine
basin and
\~e

~cDonald

basins and over to Dutch basins.

could drive our cattle over any part of the

country most practicable.
They done that.

There were no fences.

Swif's sawmill was in Robinson

hollow about a mile above the Condas house.* * *
During the time the upper mill was operating there
was quite a little trafic up and down the canyon,
hauling lumber.
Page 76:

* *

*I know of lots of sheep driven back and forth

for eight or ten years.

In the early days cattle

and some sheep driven, some horses. * *

*

Page 79:
This road that runs up to the Sullivan's ranch
and thence up into Condas ranch
veled road.

~as

~he

main tra-

The old trail was merelv a little trail.

The farmers generally furnished wood to the
mills for roasting ores until close to 1900.
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This White Pine road passes up thru my land,
not very much maybe 50, 75 or 100 feet.

No inter-

ference with the use of this road or any obstruction
until Mr. Sullivan got up there.
Canyon road is well defined.

The White Pine

If people had any

business in there that is the road they took.
White Pine canyon is 3 miles in length, White
Pine canyon is not precipitious or steep.

A good

many mining claims located in that section.*

*

*

***
THOMAS L. POWERS, a witness for defendant, being sworn, on direct
examination testified as follows:
Page 81:
***I have know White Pine canyon for 35 years.
I have dealt some in livestock, not very largely.
I know the White Pine canyon road.
in there 33 years ago.
there used the road.

I drove cattle

Anybody who wanted to go up
Since I have known the road it

has been used just to haul some timbers out and to
drive livestock back and forth, to haul logs and
fence poles.

It has been used by the public since

I've know it, continuously.
Page 83:

***

It was a beaten road for a wagon.

There was

no occasion for people to travel it except to get
out logs and fence posts.

I haven't driven cattle in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-33Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the canyon since Redden homsteaded.
thirteen years.
about 1896.
1914.

Eleven or

I started driving cattle there

I drove the last about 1912 or

During that time no timber, but some logs

were hauled down to Snyderville, some to Park City.
The road went as far up as Iron Meadow and White
Pine meadow, later in 1912.* * *
Pages 84-85:
DAVE SNYDER, being sworn, testified for defendant as follows:

On direct examination:
I live at Snyderville and farm as a business.
I have lived there 61 years.
business.

I am 61 years old.

Also in the livestock
I have known Red Pine

and White Pine canyons practically all my life.
There is a road leading up White Pine canyon.
has been there ever since I can remember.

It

It has

been used by the public since I have known it for
hauling wood, driving stock, hauling logs and mining
timbers and cordwood.*

* *

Page 87:

* *

o'<

Twenty- five years ago I hauled ·.-ood and logs

over the road above the Condas land.

All of the

land was then under the government.
Pages 88-89
R.J. BAILEY, a witness for defendant, on direct examination,
testified as follows
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I am 64 years old.

I reside at Mill Creek.

Have resided there 64 years.

I am a sheep raiser.

I have known White Pine canyon 26 or 27 years.
When I first became acquainted with it there was
a fair trail, fair road for a wagon up that canyon.
I don't know the Lake and Redden places.
own it when I went through there.

They didn't

About 24 years

ago I first took sheep through there.

We went up

Trottman's Lane, turned to the left, then during that
period we went up that canyon in June of each year,
and out in the fall.

Went up and down the canyon

frequently with a cart--the front wheels of a wagon-for supplies and hay for the sheep.
nine years.
19 years ago.

Quite a while ago.

For eight or

Along about 18 or

My last trip in there was in 1919.

** *
"Q.--And was there a well defined road during
that period you went up with your sheep?
I could get along."

A.--Yes,

The road was 2 to 3 rods wide.

We were never interferred with.

I know other sheep

men that trailed sheep up that canyon.
trailed their sheep up that road.,,

Others

* *

Page 90:

***

In 1919 I come down on horseback.

"Q. --Now,

the Sullivan place was taken up before that?"

A.--
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I just rode by.

I didn't inquire who owned it.

The boy took the sheep up there.

I took my cart

right up to the Western Monitor mine, the head of
Iron canyon.
About five miles.

It was a public highway.

Its destination--the Western Monitor mine in Iron
canyon at the head.
you want to.

You can go up that road if

In 1919 you could go up with a

cart, not a car.

We could have done the same in

1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917.

I cannot recall when

we last went up there with a wagon as described.
Page 94:
DELBERT H. REDDEN,

for defendant,

testified, on direct examination,

as follows:
I live at Park City, I have lived there about
30 years.

I have been acquainted with wnite Pine

Canyon since about 1900.

Since then there has al-

ways been a road leading up White Pine Canyon.

* * '"
Since my acquaintance with it, this highway, it
has

bee~

used for hauling logs,

timbers and poles,

and b:.· stockmen and sheepmen, mvself
Page~

i::~cluded.

97-98:
*In l92l I got $500 worth of timber in the right
hand fork of '..Jhite Pine, anJ hauleJ them to the Dalv
JuJge mine.

· Above the ranch •.,nice Pine canyon
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is used generally for cattle and sheep grazing;
mostly sheep and White Pine canyon road is the
only way, the only access.
and exception).

(This last over objection

Since I have been up there that

canyon has been used by the public and private
persons for grazing livestock.
and exception).

(This over objection

In my grazing of the White Pine

territory the livestock was trailed up and down the
bottom of the canyon.
exception).

(This over objection and

With reference to the bottom of the

canyon the road runs right through the Sullivan and
Condas places and down Trottman Lane to the county
road.***
Page 99:
* * *At that time there was a traveled wagon road
up White Pine canyon above my homestead, the present
Condas place.***
Pages 100-101:
Above 1918 or '19 I should say there was a wagon
road on the right hand side of the canyon about half
a mile above Condas house and also an old road in
the canyon.
Condas house?

"Q.--You mean in the bottom, above the
A.--All the way up the canyon.

Q. --

So, if I understand it, you say in 1918 there was a
wagon road extending above the Condas house, White
Pine Canyon, about half a mile?

A.--Above the house."
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The old road continued up the bottom.

To my personal

knowledge, a wagon road extended above the Condas
house up

'~ite

Pine Canyon clear to the top.

was always there.

It

The old road from the Condas house

to the top of White Pine Canyon.
while I lived there.

It was always there

I don't know if it is there now.

It extended about five miles above the Condas ranch
to the Western

~lonitor

mine.

It did when I was last

there in 1923.
Pages 102-103.

* * *

I know of no factories or settlements up there.

Hunters and fishers, sheeprnen and cattlemen came direct to my place and they go to the tops of the
mountains, sometimes with their fishing tackle, guns,
cattle and sheep, I would call the canyon to the
tops of mountains public highways. ***I suppose
there •was a public thoroughfare from \,'hite Pine
Canvon over to Brighton. i: was used.

I •..;ant the

record to show that there was a public thoroughfare
from :oihite Pine can::on to Bri,;::ton.

Archibald, Powers, Johnson, all o:

~v

nei~hbors

hauleJ wooJ. posts, poles out anJ drove cat:le up
anJ

uo'~Tt

'>•r.i:e P:.ne can::on JGrins 1.:30::3 :o lc.l08. l>hile

I lived in SnvJerville.
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APPENDIX B
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This cause came on regularly for trial before the court,
sitting without a jury, upon the complaint of the plaintiffs,
Claron C. Spencer, and Richard G. Allen of Senior and Senior
appeared for the plaintiffs.
defendants.

Joseph Novak Appeared for the

Evidence was introduced by the respective parties

and considered by the court, and the court being fully advised in
the premises and having found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, makes the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs are the owners of the following described

lands in the White Pine Canyon area of Summit County, Utah:
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLM
Section 12:
Section 13:
Section 14:
2.

Lot 4, Wl/2SEl/4, SWl/4
Wl/2NW1/4
NEl/4NEl/4, Wl/2NE1/4, NWl/4

The defendants are the owners of the following des-

cribed lands in the White Pine Canyon area of Sumit County, Utah·
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SUI
Section

1:

Section 12:
Section 13:

Lots 9, 10, 13, 14,
Wl/2SE1/4
Lots l, 2, 3, Wl/2NEl/4
Lot l

-39-
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3.

There is a roadway, passing up White Pine Canyon

through and beyond the above-described lands of the defendants
and the plaintiffs to the public domain.

Said roadway is a

public road and has been used by the plaintiffs and the defendants
and their predecessors in interest and by the public generally
since 1873.
4.

The public's use of said roadway for more than

fifty years prior to 1928 was for the general purpose of traffic
including the hauling and transportation of logs, firewood,
lumber, mining timber, supplies for mining operations, for the
trailing of livestock including cattle, sheep and horses, and
for all purposes for which public highways under similar conditions
were then

~sed.

The public continued to use the roadway until it

was closed by the defendants in 1971.
5.

The uses made by said roadwav were on foot, by

horseback. in hore
6.

draw~

wagons and in trucks and cars.

In the case of Sullivan v. Candas. which was filled

in the Third Judicial Court in and for Summit County, Civil No.
42140, and decided in 1928, defendants'

alleged in his Ar:lended .:..r.s1,rer

~:-.a.:::

grantor. John G. Candas,

there 1,ras and had been for

sixty vears a '·"ell tra•;eled road up '.-ihi:::e Pine Canvon through
and bevond the defendants' lanes and that
used as a public road by the oublic

~he

~enerallv

road had been
for

~ore

than 60

:;ears.
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7.

The district court in Sullivan v. Condas case

found that the roadway up White Pine Canyon was a public road
and had been used by the public openly, notoriously, continuously,
uninterruptedly, adversely and under claim of right as a public
road since 1873.

The court also found that said roadway imme-

diately north of defendants' property was 3 rods in width
"and that said witdth has been and is necessary in the enjoyment
of said roadway for the purposes for which it has been used and
is now being used by the public generally and by the 'defendants'
'grantor' and his predecessors in interest".

The width of said

roadway, through the defendants' lands, is a minimum sufficient
to accommodate a motor vehicle of the size of a three-quarter
ton pickup truck and a maximum of two rods.
8.

Defendants offered no evidence to show that the

road up White Pine Canyon through the lands now owned by them
was not a public road from 1873 to 1924 as alleged by their
grantor and as found to be fact in the case of Sullivan v.
Condas.
9.

During the years 1925 to 1928, John G. Condas,

predecessor in interest of defendants, constructed a series
of fences and gates within the northerly portion of his propert:;
dividing the same into several pastures and corral areas which
included a wooden gate across the roadway entering his propert:1
on the north line thereof and a series of division fences and
wire gates along the roadway through his pasture and corral
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areas and a wooden gate of only sufficient width to permit
passage of a person riding horseback across the roadway near
the southerly end of his pasture area.
10.

The wooden gate and its replacements constructed

across the roadway on the north line of the John G. Candas property was usually maintained in a closed and locked condition,
whenever John G. Candas and his successors were away from the
property. generally since the construction thereof until the
present time and was generally maintained in a closed but unlocked
condition when they were present on the property and said gates
were generally posted with "keep out" or "no trespassing" signs
since the construction thereof until the present time.
ll.

During the period of 1926 to 1932, inclusive,

entry upon and use of the roadway up

~Tiite

Pine Canyon across

defendants' property by plaintiffs' predecessor in interest was
with the

pe~.ission

and consent of defendants' predecessor in

interest who provided a key to the locked gate to plaintiff's
predecessor in interest.
12.

During the period from 1933 to 1970, inclusive,

plaintiffs and/or their predecessor in interest. leased their
land to defendants' predecessor in interest and/or defendants
or the

la~ds

of both parties

~ere

~ointlv

leased to third persons

and all during said period che entry upon and use of the roadwav
up white Pine Cc1n:;on across detencants' propert:' bv plaintiffs
and their predecessor in interest ~as ~ith the consent and
pe~miss1on ·Jf de~en~ants

3n~ or

:~~i~ ?r~~eces5or

in interest.
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13.

Notwithstanding the foregoing findings 9, 10,

11 and 12, the use of the roadway by plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest, and within the times limited in
said Findings, was under a claim of right and not in recognition
of defendants' claimed right to grant or deny permission to
use same.
14.

The evidence is insufficient to support a finding

that the use of the roadway up White Pine Canyon across defendants'
property by plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest was
continuous, open and adverse under a claim of riht for a period
of 20 years or that plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest
established a prescriptive right of passage over the roadway up
White Pine Canyon across defendants' property.
15.

In 1971, he defendants placed iron gates across

the roadway up White Pine Canyon and have maintained the gates
so that the plaintiffs are barred from entrance to their lands
either from the north or south along said roadway.

The public

generally is denied free travel along said road.
16.

In 1972, defendants petitioned the Board of

County Commissioners of Summit County to vacate a portion of
the roadway as a public road where it passes through defendants'
lands in Section 1.
17.

Pursuant to defendants' petition and upon

representations by the defendants that no one but he defendants
used the road, the Board of County Commissioners enacted Ordin-
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ance No. 63 on September 6, 1972, as corrected by amended
Ordinance No. 67, which purported to vacate the public roadway
through a portion of defendants'
18.

land.

The Board of County Commissioners for Summit

County did not give notice of the vacation to the plaintiffs
in this action, nor did they publish notice of the vacation
prior to enacting the vacating ordinance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The roadway which passes up White Pine Canyon

through and beyond the lands of the defendants and the plaintiffs
is a public road.
2.

The defendants are estopped from denying that

said roadway is a public road.
3.

The said roadway may be maintained by the plaintiffs

and the public generally through the defendants'

lands to a

minimum width sufficient to accommodate a motor vehicle the
size of a three-quarter ton pickup truck and to a maximum width
of two rods as may be necessary to provide for the convenient
and safe use of the public in the light of present and future
modes of transportation.
4.

Said public road has not been abandoned or vacated

by competent public authorit:'·

The action of the Summit Countv

Commission in 1972 in attempting to vacate a ;:JOri t ion of said
public road ..

~ ~as

anullitv anJ Surr.rnit Countv Ordinance :.:o. 63,
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dated September 6, 1972, as corrected by Amended Ordinance
No. 67, insofar as it purports to vacate a portion of the
public road through defendants' property is null and void.
5.

That plaintiffs have failed to establish the

existence of a prescriptive easement over the defendants'
property as alleged in their pleadings.

The plaintiffs are

entitled to their costs in this proceeding.
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APPENDIX C
DECREE
The court being fully advised in the premises, having
found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, and having made findings of fact and conclusions of
law herein;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1.

That the existing roadway up White Pine Canyon

in Summit County, Utah, as it passes through and beyond the
following described lands of the defendants
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLM
Section 1:
Section 12:
Section 13:

Lots 9 . 10 , 13
14, Wl/2SEl/ 4
Lots 1, 2. 3,
Wl/ 2~wl/ 4
Lot 1

is a public road.
2.

That the plaintiffs, their agents. representatives,

employees and successors in interest and the public generally
have the right to use said roadway as a public road free of
interference from the defendants,

thei~ agents,

employees and

successors in interest.
3.

That the defendants shall forthwith remove the

gates which they have erected across said roadwav.
4.

That the ?laintiffs and the public generally mav

maintain said roam.;ay throm;h defendants'

lands to minimum width
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sufficient to accommodate a motor vehicle the size of a
three-quarter ton pickup and to a maximum width of two rods,
as may be necessaiy to provide for the convenient and safe
use of the public in the light of present and future modes of
transportation.
5.

That the defendants and each of them, their

agents, representatives, employees and successors in interest
are premanently enjoined from interfering with or in any manner
obstructing, either directly or indirectly, the use, occupancy
and enjoyment of said roadway by the plaintiffs, their agents,
representatives, employees and successors in interest and by
the public generally through the said lands of the defendants.
6.

That the plaintiffs recover their costs of this

action.
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